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The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.In recentyearsthe conventional wisdom
about exchange rates has shifted
from an exclusive emphasis oncurrent and expected future moneysupplies to a
new view which assigns an importantrole to the current account.In spite of
the popularity of this new view,however, there has been littleagreement on
the actual channel through whichthe current account affects theexchange rate.
There seem to be three distinct positions.One position, exemplified by Mussa
(1980) and given some empirical supportby the work of Freedman
(1979), isthat the current account matters onlybecause itisan indicator
oflong—run shifts in the purchasingpower parity relationship.A second
position, developed theoretically byDornbusch and Fischer (1980)andgiven
some empirical support by recent work byFrankel (1980), is that the current
accountmatters because wealth affects the demandfor money. Finally there
is theportfolio balance approach developed byBranson (1977) and Kouri (l976a).
Inthisview, the redistribution of world wealthwhich current account
imbalances produce alters the demand for bondsdenominated in different cur-
rencies, producingshifts in interest differentials which in turnalter
relative money demands.
This paper is an attempt to examine someof the microeconomic foundations
of this last --1 ewof the link between currerr accountsand exchange rata.-
Severalauthors, especially Kouri and deMacedo (1978), but also more recently
Dornbusch (1980), have sought to justifythe portfolio aiproach in terms of
finance theory, deriving asset demandsfrom a mean—variance framework and
arguing that differences in the portfoliosof different countries explain
why changes in the worlddistribution of wealth affect exchange rates.What9
Iwill do in this paper is to argue that, even under seemingly favorable
assumptions, these distribution effects nay run the wrong way; that if they
runthe right way, they will be very weak; and that the incentives for inter-
national, portfolio diversification are in any case small, and canbeswamped
by quite modest transaction costs or other costs to diversification.
Thispaper is in four sections. Section 1 briefly reviews the argument
about how an effect of current accounts on exchange rates can be ,jüstified
in a finance theory framework, then shows by a numerical example how the ef-
fect can run in the wrong direction. Section 2 sets out a formal model in
which the condition for distribution effects running the rightway can be
explicitly derived. Section 3 then develops a continuous—time model in
whichan explicitalgebraic treatment of the distribution effect on the for-
ward premiumcan be conducted, an& uses some semi—realistic numbers to show
the effect's unimportance. Finally, Section 4 considersthe gains to
diversification,and presents an argument that transaction costs may be as
important or more important than mean—variance considerations in determining
international portfolios.
1. Wealth Distribution and theForward Premium.
AsKouri and de Macedo(l978) have pointed out, the essence of the port-
folio balance explanation of the current account's role in exchange rates lies
in what they Lall the "wealth transfer effc.". Suppose that Americans nr 1d
a higher proportion of their wealth in dollar denominated assets than Germans
do. Thenaredistribution of wealth from America to Germany, occurring over
time through current account imbalances, will reduce the demand for dollar
denominated assets and increase the demand for mark denominated assets, re-
quiring either a rise in the U.S.—German interest differential or a deprecia—
tionof the dollar. The rote of the current account inexchange rate determination -3.
arises from the assumed tendency of residents of each country to hold a larger
proportion of their wealth in domestic—currency—denominated assets than
foreignersdo. (This is a point which is somewhat obscured in "small country"
models, such as those of Branson (1977), Kouri (l976a),and Dornbusch and Fischer
(1980) ,inwhich it is assumed that the home country holds foreign assets but
foreigners do not hold domestic assets. This of course implies that home
country residents do hold a larger share of their wealth •in domestic—currency
denominated assets; and it is this, rather than the small—country aspect of
the story, which really does the work of moving the exchange rate).
Wherefinance theory comes into this story is in explaining ! residents
of each country should have a "local habitat" in domestic bonds. Essentially.
it is argued that Americans hold American assets because they buy American
goods. That is, because the consumption basket of each country is weighted
toward domestically producedgoods whose prices are set in domestic currency,
riskaverse investors will tend to choose a portfolio with a disproportionate
share of assets denominated in domestic currency.
We can clarify the point by considering a world of two countries, America
and Britain, where the only assets are nominal bonds denominated in dollars
and pounds. Suppose that prices of American and British goods are predictable
inrms of dollars and pounds respectively, so that the only uncertainty is
about exchange rata changes. Then an individual who consumes only American
goods will be able to avoid all risk by holding only dollar bonds, and will
hold pound bonds only if they offer a higher expected real return. Similarly,
an individual who consumes only British goods will hold only pound bonds un-
less offered a higher expected real return on dollar bonds. If we can take
it as given that Americans will spend a higher proportion of their income on
American goods than Britains will, this seems to give a simple justification4.
for the asstmlption that donestic residentshave a local habitat in domestic
currencybonds. The point canbe further emphasized if onegoes to a
mean—varianceframework, as Kouri and de Macedo (1978), de Macedo (1980),and
Dornbusch (1980) do. In such a framework theoptimal portfolio consists of a
"safe" asset plus a speculative portfolio whichdepends on expected returns ——
andthe safe asset consists of dollar bonds fora dollar consumer, pound bonds
for a pound consumer.
-
Unfortunately,the case for a wealth transfer effect of theright sign
is not as clear—cut as this argument makes itseem. The reason is that ex-
pected real returns depend on the constimption basket ——andthey do so in such
a way as to encourage holding of bonds denominated inforeign currency.
Consider the example in Table I.For simplicity we consider a situation
inwhich interest rates are zero on both types of bonds.At time t=0, one
dollar is worth SOp; at time t1, a dollar will withequal probability he worth
1pound and3Op. Thustheexpected numberof dollars per pound is 2 1/6,
while the expected number of poundsper dollar is .65.
Table I
t=0:S=2 or 1/S=.5
t=O: S =31/3 or1/S =.3withprobability 1/2
S=1 with probability 1/2
E[SJ =21/6 E[l/S] =.65
What would an investor do in this situation? Itdepends on two things:
his consumption tastes, and his degree of riskaversion. One extreme case
would be that of completely risk—averse investors.These investors will
hold dollar bonds if they consume Americangoods, pound bonds if they con-
sume-British goods. If investors are risk neutral, however, thisresult5.
be reversed. Pound bonds have a positive expected return in termsofdollars,
while dollar bonds have a positive expected return in terms of pounds. Thus
in this case we will have cross—holding,the reverse of the local habitat story.
This paradoxical possibility results from Jensents inequality. There is
a small literature on the role of Jensen's inequality in international finance
(see Siegel (1972), Roper (1975), andMcCulloch(1975).
theupshot of which was that the discrepancy caused by this effect was too
small to have anypracticalimportance. One might expect that this would im-
ply thateven slight risk aversion would be enough to establish the preferred
habitat result. however, this is not the case. Consider a Bernoulli in-
vestor, i.e. ,onewhose utility is linear in the log of expected wealth.
Such an investor would not ordinarily be considered to have an unreasonably
low degree of risk aversion.Yet the Bernoulli case is not enough to estab-
lish a preferred habitat result. Let W be wealth in dollars, and S the
dollar—pound exchange rate. Then a Bernoulli investor who consumes American
goods will maximize E[Zn WI ,whilean investor who consumes British goods will
maximize E[n W/S]=—E[LnSI +E[n Wi.Since EIZn 5] is unaffected by the
choice of portfolio, the two investors willhold the same portfolio.(In the
example in Table I they will hold 43 percentdollars, 57percentpoutids).
Thissuggests investors will have a local habitat in bonds only if they
aresufficiently risk averse, and that the degree of risk aversion required
is not trivial. We will see below that wkiat is in fact required ——asche
Bernoulli example may have suggested ——isrelative risk aversion greater than
one.Furthermore, the example suggests that the role of risk aversion in
international portfolio decisions is comparable in magnitude to that of Jen-
sen's inequality ——aneffect which has generally been dismissed as trivial.
If this is the case, presumably the importance of risk aversion is also minor.
Ourcalculations later will support this view.0.
2.A Formal Model.
The basic idea of the finance theory view of distribution effectson
exchangerates is that investors have a "local habitat" biased toward assets
denominated in domestic currency because they spend arelatively higher pro-
portion oftheir income on domestic goods. This presumes, ofcourse, that
the purchasing power of domestic currency aver domestic goods ismore pre-
dictable than the purchasing power of foreigncurrency over domestic goods;
i.e., that inflation rates are more predictable than exchange rate changes.
This is a reasonable presumption: inflation rates are both much less variable
than exchange rate changes andmuch more seriallycorrelated (see Mussa (1980)).
In this section I will carry out a formal analysis which takes thispresumption
to its logical extreme: price levels will be assumed to be whollypredictable,
so that the only source of uncertainty is the exchange rate.
We make the following assumptions:
(i) Investors take their initial wealth, invest it for one period, then
useallof their wealth to buy consumption goods.
(ii)Thereare two countries, AmericaandBritain, each producing asingle
consumptiongood.
(iii)Thereare two assets,bonds denominated in dollars and bonds denominated
inpounds.
(iv)Allmvstors have the same degree o risk aversion, but they diffl.
intheir tastes over goods. American investors have a relative preference
for American goods.
We will assume that utility can be written in the form
U =[C C5i'' (1)7.
where CA 0B are consumption of Americanand British goods respectively.
Thi.is a constant relative risk aversion utility function, with 1 —y=It
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. R will be assumed the same for
allindividuals.However, $,whichmeasures the relative demand for British
goods, will be greater for Britons than Americans.
At the beginning of the period, investors will allocate their wealth
betweendollar bonds and pound bonds. They will be bound by the budget con-
straint
1A +EIBW (2)
where I and 'B are holdings of dollar and pound bonds respectively, E is
the beginning—of—period exchange rate, and W is beginning of period dollar
wealth.
At the end of the period, wealth measured in dollars will depend on
the initital allocation of investment, interest rates, andtheuncertain
endof period exchange rate. We can regard the exchange rate as taking on
any of a number values E., with the probability of each valte being "cIn
each such state wealth measured in dollars will be
i TA (l+iA) +EiIB (l+iB) (3)
where iB are the interest yields on dollar and pound bonds respectively.
Investors will maximize utility, subject to the budget constraint
PACA+EiPBCB=Wi
whereA' B are the end—of—period prices of American and British goods
respectively, to be known with certainty. It is convenient to write the8.





or by choice of units;
1 /
U.= E. (5')
Now consider the investor's decision problem. Each investor will want
to maximize expected utility,
EUEp.U. (6)
There is one decision variable, investment in pound bonds'B' since
EU1 'A =W—E Thus the first order conditionB where
after some manipulation we cansluwthat
y-l —fty
=K
Wi (p1 1) (7)
where K consists of terms which do not vary with the end of period





We are now prepared to askthebasic question: will British residents
hold a larger proportion of their wealth in pound bonds than Ameriaan
residents?This reduces to the question of the sign of EUID
Ifthis is positive, an increased taste for British goods will lead to
increased investment in pound denominated bonds; conversely, if it isnegative,





—YKp.W. p (p1 —1) Zn p. (9)
Inspecting(9) term bytern,wesee that all termswill be negative if y
ispositive, positive if y is negative. Recalling that the coefficient of
relativerisk aversion R is equal to1 —y,this gives us the basic
result:An increased demand fora country's goods leads toan increased
demand for assets denominated in its currency if and only if relative
risk aversion is greater than one. If relative risk aversion is less thanone,
theeffect runs the "wrong" way.
3.Distribution Effects: A Continuous Time Model
Ifrisk aversion is great enough, the wealth transferF effect will run
in the "right" direction. What we would like, however, is a measure of its
importance. It will be useful to develop a model in which we can solve
explicitlyfor the effects of a redistribution of world wealth on the
equilibrium interest differential.
Recently Kouri (1976b) de Macedo Q980 )andStulz (1980) have applied
the analysis of continuous time portfolio models to international finance.
The basic result we need .&om this analysis is the following: suppose an in—,
vestor has a constant relative risk avezsion utility function of the form
U=f 1Cdt (10)
0
where C is real consumption. Suppose further that real returns on the
assets available follow Brownian motion. Then at each point in time the10 -
investorwill choose a portfolio which maximizes
V =E(dW/W) vat (dW/W) (11)
where tisreal wealth, dW/W is its instantaneous rate of change, and
R =1—yis the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Applying this to the international problem, we simply note that real
wealth W may be defined as
=
(12)
where W is dollar wealth, E the exchange rate, and P the owncurrency
prices of American and British goods, and the share of British goods in
consumption.
As in the last section, we assumethatthere is no uncertainty about
prices. Eachpricelevel will be assumed to grow at a constant rate:
dPA=ITA Pdt (13)
dPB=lrBPBdt
The exchange rate will, however, follow Brownian motion:
dE =6E,dt + Esdz (14)
where dz is the random element.
Let us also assume that dollar and pound bonds heat fixed nominalrates
'A and iB respectively. Also, let Abethe share of wealth put intopound
bonds. Then by 1t6's Lemma, we can write the instanstaneougchangein
Was
dW/w= (1—A)1A ÷ AIB
—(1—B)ITB
(15)
dE 1 9 + (A-B) —j +(B+-2A)11.
The "Jensen's inequality" or "Siegel paradox" effec.t can be seen in
the last term. Aslongas 5>0, that is, as long as there are some British
goods in one's consumption basketthe real return on a portfolio depends
notonly on the rate of change of the exchange rate but on its variance.
Substituting from (14) and taking expectations, we find
E [dW/w] =(1— A)'AAib
-(1-5) A - B (16)
1 2
+ (A—5)+-(.+5—25A) S
forthe expected return on the portfolio; and
var (dW/W) =(A—$)22 (17)
forits variance.
We can now solve for the optimum share of pound—denominated assets.
The first—order condition is =i+ —i — — R (A—$) =0 (18) CA B A
orA =—1- [i +
S —'A + (R—l)5S2]
Itis immediately apparent that a higher share of British goods in
consumptionimplies a higher share ofpound denominated assets inone's
portfolio if and only if R >1.Further, since 3A1B5 =R— 1/R, this effect
will be small unless risk aversion is considerably more than one and will in
anycase be less than proportionate.
Giventhe expression of portfolio choic2 (18), we can now proceed to
an analysis of the size of distribution effects on the forward premium (i.e.,
the interest differential). Let
DA DB
supplies of dollar—and pound—denominated bonds
W&e WB =dollarwealthof Americans andBritons12.
5A' 8B =shareof British goods in the consuniption of Americans and
Britons
AA) An =shareof pound assets in the portfolios of Americans and Britons
We assume that SB >5A'
the question is whether this difference in con-
sumption patterns gives rise to a significant distribution effect in the
asset market.
By (18), we have
A =[i—I+6+5(R—1)s2] (19)
A RS2B A A
=[I-
'A
+ 6 + (P-i) s2]
RS2
B B
The market clearing condition is
AAWA+ A WB =
EDB
(20)
Wecan divide both sides of (20) by total world wealth,
WA + W =+EDB. and rearrange to get an expression for the forward
premium as a function of the share of pound assets in world assets supplies
and the British share in world wealth:
2 2 EDB
1B —'A






What(21) says is that: (i) an increase in the relative supply of
pounds will lower the forward premium on pounds; (ii) an.increase in the
British share of world wealth will raise the forward premium on pounds if
relative risk aversion is greater than one and Britons have a relatively
stronger taste for British goods.
-Forplausible parameter values,however, this last effect is very weak.
Considerthe effect of redistributing one percent of world wealth from13.
America to Britain ——avery large quantity compared with the wealth redis-
tribution actually involved in recent current account imbalances.Suppose
wealso mike the most extrame assumption about consumption baskets, namely
that =0,SB =1.Then the change in the forward premium is .01 RS2.
A widely accepted "reasonable" value for R is 2•
Table2: Variability of Exchange Rates




Table 2givessome representative numbers on exchange rate variability.
Usingthese numbers, we find that redistributing one percent of world wealth
would lead to a change in the forward premium of less than .02 percentage
points.
Given sufficiently strong risk aversion, then, it is possible to explain
both imperfect substitutability of bonds and distribution effects on interest
rates. But given realistic numbers, these effects will be very small. If
distribution effects in international financial marketsdo play an economically
significantrole, they must arise from sources other than risk aversion.
4. Will Investors Diversify Internationally?
In the last section we saw that for reasonable estimates of relative risk
aversion andactualexchange volatility the economic importance of international
portfolio diversification seemsdoubtful.A natural question is whether investors
themselves will bother to diversify. Realistically, there will be some costs
to international diversification of one's portfolio. Will the advantages be14.
large enough to outweigh these?
To ask this question we1 need to formulate the costs of diversification.
It seems mOst natural to suppose that there is a fixed cost to diversification.
However, in the continuous time formulation this will not be tractable. We
can easily handle the cost, however, if we model it as a fixed cost jj unit
time; this can be viewed as an approximation to a situation where there is a
simple fixed cost. The cost per unit time will simply be the fixed cost
divided by the maturity of the security.
Our revised model of portfolio choice can be written as follows. Let f
be a fixed cost per unit time which an investor must incur if he chooses to
hold foreigncurrency bonds. Thus the change in an internationally







Aninvestor who holds only domestic currency bonds, however, need not
















If f/W is large enough compared with second term, investors will not
diversify.
Consider the following example. Suppose
E[dE/El+B 'A =E [d(1IE)I(lIE)]+A —'B' i.e.,from the
pointof view of nominal returns in the other currency neither currency





+ 52/2This is as close as we can get to a situation
of pure diversification, since setting=içi3would actually mean pro-
viding a differential in real returns.
In this case, the interest rates drop out and the critical level of
2 2 fixed costs depends only on R, ,andS .SupposeR =2,S =.02,and
8=.2.Then VD _VN will be .00245 —f/w.
1ihatthis means is that a cost equal to .245 percent of wealth at an
annual rate will deter diversification. For short maturitiesthis can be
aquite small number. For three—month securities, for instance, an investor
with $10,000 will be deterred by costs of $6.13; an investor with $100,000
by costs of $61.25.
These calculations suggest that for many investors the costs of inter-
national diversification will be enou to block such diversification.
In practice, international portfolio diversification is not something
that ordinary individuals do. Instead, it is more typically something
that we associate with firms and individuals whose utility depends on the cx—
change rate in a "leveraged" way ——e.g.,importers who must commit themselves
to pay for foreign goods in future. This analysis suggests why. And it fur—16.
thur suggests that a realistic analysis of international financial markets
must take into account the fact that international investment is not costless.17.
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